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Leppard: Leppard: Arbitration - Sure, but Only on Our Terms:

NOTES
ARBITRATION? SURE, BUT

ONLY ON OUR TERMS:
ESCAPE CLAUSES
IN UNINSURED MOTORIST
POLICIES
Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co.'

I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, the insurance industry has widely used arbitration to resolve
disputes. 2 Insurance companies have increasingly included "escape clauses" in
These clauses allow an insurance company to ignore an
their policies.'
arbitrator's award and have a claim directly heard in a trial court if the award
exceeds a pre-determined amount.' The Ohio Supreme Court in Schaefer v.
Allstate InsuranceCo. addressed this issue and decided that the escape clause was
unenforceable due to public policy.'
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On November 8, 1985, an automobile occupied by David and Jeanette
Schaefer was involved in an accident with a car negligently driven by an
uninsured motorist.' At the time of the accident, the Schaefers had an insurance
policy with appellant Allstate Insurance Company that provided uninsured
with limits at $100,000 per person and $300,000 per
motorist coverage
7
occurrence.

1. 590 N.E.2d 1242 (Ohio 1992).

2. Stephen Lamson, The Impact of the FederalArbitrationAct and the McCarran-FergusonAct
on UninsuredMotorist Arbitration, 19 CONN. L. REv. 241, 242-46 (1987).
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1248.
Id. at 1243-44.
Id. at 1249.
Id. at 1243.

Id.
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After the accident, a dispute arose between the Schaefers and Allstate over
the amount of uninsured motorist benefits, if any, due to the Schaefers. 8
Pursuant to an arbitration clause in the Allstate policy,9 the parties brought the

dispute over benefits before a panel of three arbitrators for determination.' At
this hearing, there was no dispute that the uninsured motorist coverage provision
applied to this accident or that Jeanette Schaefer suffered from a serious and

perhaps permanent disability resulting from a head injury sustained in the
accident." Rather, the dispute concerned the cause of Jeanette Schaefer's head
injury: the car accident or a 1984 fall down a flight of stairs. 2 After a full
hearing, the panel decided that the Schaefers had not met their burden of proof
that the 1985 car accident was the proximate cause of the injury or that the
accident aggravated the 1984 injury.' 3 The panel did, however, decide that the

Schaefers had suffered some physical injury from the accident and thereby

4
awarded $500 to David and $1500 to Jeanette.'
After the parties entered into the insurance contract, but prior to the
accident, Allstate had issued an amendment to the contract designed to replace the
original clause requiring arbitration."' The amendment was the applicable clause
in the event that a dispute arose between Allstate and the insured parties.' 6 The
amendment clause stated that any arbitration award not exceeding the limits
imposed by the Ohio Financial Responsibility Law' 7 would bind both parties and
could be entered as a judgment in a proper court, but any award exceeding such

8. Id.
9. The original Allstate insurance policy issued to the Schaefers contained the following
arbitration clause:
If any person making claim hereunder and Allstate do not agree that such person is
legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured
automobile because of bodily injury to the insured, or do not agree as to the amount of
payment which may be owing under this coverage, then, upon written demand of either,
the matter or matters upon which such person and Allstate do not agree shall be settled
by arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association, and
judgment upon the award rendered by the arbitrators may be entered in any court having
jurisdiction thereof. Such person and Allstate agree to consider itself bound and to be
bound by any award made by the arbitrators pursuant to this coverage.
Id. at 1247.
10. Id. at 1243.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1247-48. Such amendments are known as "endorsements." See id. at 1247.
16. Id. at 1248.
17. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4509.01-.99 (Anderson 1988 & Supp. 1991). The Ohio Financial
Responsibility Law requires that every person be insured to a minimum of $12,500 per person or
$25,000 per occurrence. Id. §§ 4509.01(K), .20(A).
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limits could be taken by either party to a trial court of competent jurisdiction

regarding any issue. 8
On August 11, 1989, the Schaefers filed a motion to vacate the panel's
award in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, claiming that the terms

9
They
of the amendment were unconscionable and against public policy.'
heard
claims
their
to
have
allowed
be
they
that
advanced an alternative request

before an appropriate trial court.2' The court denied the motion and confirmed

the panel's award. 2'
On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Tenth District concluded that
the provision allowing a party a trial de novo if the amount exceeded the financial
22
The
responsibility law was "so fundamentally unfair as to be unconscionable.
portion
that
to
recognize
court, in an attempt to remedy the unfairness, refused
of the provision making an award binding so that all awards were appealable de
novo.2 3 In so doing, the appeals court reversed the trial court and remanded the

case for further proceedings.24
Finding that its decision conflicted with other Ohio courts of appeals, the
appellate court certified the case to the Supreme Court of Ohio for review and
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court,
final determination.'

holding that when an insurance contract contains a provision for arbitration to be
binding only if it is within certain limits and otherwise to be reviewable de novo,
whether or not knowingly bargained for, the policy interest of the state favoring
arbitration (1) requires that such a clause be unenforceable and (2) allows that

either party may seek de novo review from a proper trial court.26

18. Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1243-44. While Allstate and the Schaefers interpreted the
amendment differently, both parties agreed that the relevant provision was as follows:
Regardless of the method of arbitration, any award not exceeding the limit of the
Financial Responsibility law of Ohio will be binding and may be entered as a judgment
in a proper court. Regardless of the method of arbitration when any arbitration award
exceeds the Financial Responsibility limits of the State of Ohio either party has a right
to a trial on all issues in a court of competent jurisdiction. This right must be exercised
within 60 days of the award.
Id. at 1247.
19. Id.at 1244.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1248-50. The Schaefer case was in fact consolidated with another case, Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fallon-Murphy, Case Nos. 91-2105 & 91-2333. The facts of Fallon-Murphy
were very similar to the facts of Schaefer, and the insurance clause at issue was identical. See
Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1249. In Fallon-Murphy, however, the panel of arbitrators awarded the
plaintiffs $1 million, which the insurance company immediately appealed. Id. Justice Douglas, in
his plurality opinion in Schaefer, recognized that the sword cut both ways in holding that the escape
clause was unenforceable. See id. Since both sides could immediately litigate the issue, the award
of the arbitrators would not be binding, and when the trial jury brought in a lower figure for plaintiffs,
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LEGAL BACKGROUND

The origins of arbitration are ancient. Arbitration has been said to pre-date
the legal systems of both the Greeks and the Romans.'
While many realized
the benefits of an arbitration system,'
English courts and, later, American
courts were generally hostile to enforcing agreements to arbitrate.29 This
hostility took the form of the doctrine of revocability, which provided that either
party to a disagreement could revoke an agreement to arbitrate future disputes for
any reason2 0 Judicial hostility to enforcing such agreements has been linked to
jealousy over jurisdiction, 3' to a fear of loss of income,32 and to concerns that
parties involved would not receive fair and adequate treatment due to an
arbitrator's lesser authority compared to that of a judge. 3 Scott v. Aver
significantly modified the English common law by holding that while persons
could not agree to oust the jurisdiction of the courts, they could agree that no
cause of action would arise until after the dispute had been submitted to
35
arbitrators.
In the United States, courts were hesitant to depart from the common law in
the absence of statutory guidance.' To remedy this situation and to pave the
way for courts to enforce arbitration agreements, New York in 1920 became the
first state to pass an arbitration statute.3' Congress followed New York's lead

they would have to abide by that lower figure. Id.
27. Earl S. Wolaver, The HistoricalBackground of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV.
132, 132 (1934).
28. See id. at 133-35 (discussing gilds and fair courts in England in the Middle Ages).
29. Michael L. Taviss, Adventures in Arbitration: The AppealabilityAmendment to the Federal
ArbitrationAct, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 559, 562 (1990).
30. Wolaver, supra note 27, at 138-44.
31. This jealousy developed into the doctrine of "ousting," which provided that no agreement
between citizens could oust the court's jurisdiction and prohibit that court from hearing the case. See
id. at 139. This also acted to discourage individuals from seeking forms of settlement outside the
official realm. Id. The doctrine was first laid down in Kill v. Hollister, 1 Wilson 129 (K.B. 1746).
Id.
32. Taviss, supra note 29, at 563 (citing Kulkundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126
F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942) (judges prohibiting arbitration as a means to protecting their income)).
33. Zhaodong Jiang; FederalArbitration Law and State Court Proceedings, 23 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 473, 478 n.20 (1990) (citing Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1320-21 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1845)).
34. 5 H.L. Cas. 811 (1856).
35. Wolaver, supra note 27, at 141-43.
36. Zhaodong Jiang, supra note 33, at 479.
37. See Tariss, supra note 29, at 563; see also N.Y. Arbitration Act, ch. 275, 2 N.Y. Laws 803
(1920).
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have
and in 1925 enacted the Federal Arbitration Act,3" which federal courts
39
litigation.
over
arbitration
favoring
mandate
legislative
a
as
interpreted
The FAA is important because it makes any agreement to arbitrate valid and
enforceable, limited only by revocation principles in contract law. 40 The FAA
sets guidelines for having a court of competent jurisdiction confirm the award, 4'
outlines the procedure and grounds for vacating an award,4' and provides a
method for appealing an award.43 It must be noted that the grounds for vacating
an award are narrow: Arbitration under the act is allowed only for corruption,
fraud, or undue means;' partiality or corruption of arbitrators;45 and arbitrator
misconduct, imperfect execution, or abuse of power." Motions to vacate must
47
be made and served upon the adverse party within three months of the award.
In addition, the appropriate district court has the power to modify an award where
there was a mistake, where a decision was made on matters outside of the
arbitration, or where an award was improper in form but in which the merits of
the decision were unaffected." Thus the federal statute, in addition to ensuring
the enforceability of an arbitration agreement, makes an arbitration award
relatively final and reversible only under certain circumstances.
The common law also was hostile to the enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate, but not to the enforcement of arbitration awards.4 9 Both English and
American courts held that once an award was made, the reasons for not enforcing
an arbitration agreement were less compelling than when the agreement was still
executory.5 0 As early as 1854, the United States Supreme Court held that
"[airbitrators are judges chosen by the parties to decide the matters submitted to
them, finally and without appeal. As a mode of settling disputes, [arbitration]
should receive every encouragement from courts of equity." 5
The FAA reflected this federal respect for the awards of arbitration, as did
similar state statutes. The practice of codifying such arbitration practices gained
popularity, with a great majority of states following the example of the FAA and
enacting similar statutes. At the time of this writing, every state in the Union has

38. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§
1-15 (1988) [hereinafter FAA]); see Taviss, supra note 29, at 563.
39. See Volt Info. Sciences v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1988); see also Dean
Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,
10-11 (1983).
40. 9 U.S.C. §2.
41. Id.§ 9.

42. Id.§ 10.
43. Id.§ 15.
44. Id.§ 10(a).
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.§ 10(b).
Id.§ 10 (c)-(d).
Id.§ 12.
Id.§ 11.
Zhaodong Jiang, supra note 33, at 478 n.21.
Id.
Burcheli v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854).
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adopted some type of statute controlling arbitration, while 34 states and the
District of Columbia have directly adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act.52

As arbitration gained popularity as a viable and enforceable alternative to

litigation, insurance companies increasingly used it to resolve disputes.53 The

52. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1-25, 7 U.L.A. 5 (1985) [hereinafter U.A.A.]. The U.A.A.
is one of the most important modem arbitration statutes adopted by states. The current U.A.A. was
approved in 1955 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Bar Association.
Fifty jurisdictions have adopted some type of modem arbitration statute with 34 states adopting
the U.A.A. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.43.010-.180 (1983) (adopting U.A.A.); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 12-1501 to -1518 (1982) (adopting U.A.A.); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-108-201 to -224
(Michie 1987) (adopting U.A.A.); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1298.8 (West 1980 & Supp.
1989); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-22-201 to -223 (1987) (adopting U.A.A.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 52-408 to -424 (West 1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5701-5725 (1975) (adopting U.A.A.);
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-4301 to -4314 (1989) (adopting U.A.A.); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 682.01-.20
(West Supp. 1989) (adopting U.A.A.); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-1 to -83 (Supp. 1989); HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 658-1 to -12 (1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 7-901 to -922 (1979) (adopting U.A.A.); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 10, para. 101-123 (1987) (adopting U.A.A.); IND. CODE §§ 34-4-2-1 to -22 (1986)
(adopting U.A.A.); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 679A.1-.14 (West 1987) (adopting U.A.A.); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 5-401 to -422 (1982) (adopting U.A.A.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 417.045-.230
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988) (adopting U.A.A.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4201-4217 (West
1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 5927-5949 (West 1980) (adopting U.A.A.); MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-201 to -234 (1984) (adopting U.A.A.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
251, §§ 1-19 (West 1988) (adopting U.A.A.); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 600.5001-.5305 (Callaghan
1988) (adopting U.A.A.); MINN. STAT, ANN. §§ 572.08-.30 (West 1988) (adopting U.A.A.); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 11-15-101 to -143 (Supp. 1988) (adopting statutory rles for arbitrating future disputes
which only apply to construction contracts with some exceptions); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 435.350-.470
(Supp. 1989) (adopting U.A.A.); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-111 to -324 (1989) (adopting U.A.A.);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-2601 to -2622 (Supp. 1988) (adopting U.A.A.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
38.015-.205 (Michie 1987) (adopting U.A.A.); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 542:1-10 (1974); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-1 (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7-1 to -22 (Michie 1978) (adopting
U.A.A.); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 7501-7514 (McKinney 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.1-.20
(1983) (adopting U.A.A.); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-29.2-01 to -20 (Supp. 1989) (adopting U.A.A.);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2711.01-.24 (Anderson 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 801-818
(West Supp. 1989) (adopting U.A.A.); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 33.210-.300 (1987); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 7301-7320 (1982) (adopting U.A.A.); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-3-1 to -21 (1985); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 15-48-10 to -240 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988) (adopting U.A.A.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 21-25A-1 to -38 (1987) (adopting U.A.A.); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-5-301 to -320 (Supp. 1988)
(adopting U.A.A.); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 224 to 238-6 (West Supp. 1989) (adopting
U.A.A.); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-31a-I to -18 (1987) (adopting U.A.A.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§§ 5651-5681 (Supp. 1989) (adopting U.A.A.); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.01 to .016 (Michie
Supp. 1989) (adopting U.A.A.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.04.010-220 (West 1961); WiS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 788.01-.18 (West 1981); Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-36-101 to -119 (1988) (adopting U.A.A.); see
also Recent Developments: The Uniform ArbitrationAct, 1992 J. DISP. RESOL. 411, 411. Puerto
Rico has also adopted a similar arbitration statute. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32, §§ 3201-3229 (1990).
Zhaodong Jiang in his article indicates that West Virginia and Alabama have adopted no
arbitration statutes, when actually both have adopted quite complex statutes controlling arbitration
which are similar to both the U.A.A. and the Ohio arbitration statutes at issue here. See Zhaodong
Jiang, supra note 33, at 475 n.7; ALA. CODE §§ 6-6-1 to -16 (1977); W. VA. CODE § 55-10-1 to -8
(1981).
53. See generally Lamson, supra note 2.
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most common form of arbitration clause today is that typically found in ordinary
uninsured motorist coverage.54 The clause usually takes the form of an
agreement to arbitrate a dispute arising out of either an entitlement to payment or
the amount of payment and includes an agreement to be bound by the results of
Again, the result of the arbitration is final and binding.56 Once
arbitration.
an award is rendered in an uninsured motorist arbitration, there are relatively few
grounds for setting it aside; the award is considered inviolable."7
In enacting an arbitration statute, the state of Ohio decided not to adopt the
FAA wholesale, although the statute Ohio did adopt reflected a majority of the
FAA's basic premises.5 The Ohio code provides for enforcement of agreements
to arbitrate, subject only to the law of contract and excluding most arbitration
agreements dealing with real estate.5 9 A party can obtain a court order
compelling a reluctant party to proceed with arbitration as agreed upon,' and
that party can also apply to the Court of Common Pleas at any time within one
The Ohio code also
year of an arbitration award to have it confirmed. 6
provides a means to vacate the award under specific circumstances: if the award
was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; if the arbitrators were
corrupt or partial; if the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct or misbehavior
which resulted in prejudice to a party; or if the arbitrators exceeded their powers
or imperfectly executed them.' Ohio trial courts also have the power to modify

54. Id. at 243.
55. Id. at 244. The Lamson article includes a sample standard form insurance arbitration clause,
which is substantially similar to the original arbitration clause in the Allstate policy at issue in the
present case. See id. n. 14. The standard form reads:
If any person making claim hereunder and the company do not agree that such person is
legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured highway
vehicle because of bodily injury to the insured, or do not agree as to the amount of
payment which may be owing under this insurance, then, upon written demand of either,
the matter or matters upon which such person and the company do not agree shall be
settled by arbitration, which shall be conducted in accordance with the roles of the
American Arbitration Association unless other means of conducting the arbitration are
agreed to between the insured and the company, and judgment upon the award rendered
by the arbitrators may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. Such person
and the company each agree to consider itself bound and to be bound by any award made
by the arbitrators pursuant to this insurance.
Id.
56. Id. at 244.
57. Gerald Asken, Arbitration of UninsuredMotorist EndorsementClaims, 24 OHio ST. L.J. 589,
606-07 (1963); see also Alan I. Widiss, Perspectives on Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 62 Nw. U.
L. REV. 497, 544-45 (1967). For the grounds for setting aside an arbitration award, see supra notes
44-46 and accompanying text.
58. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2711.01-.36 (Anderson 1988).
59. Id. § 2711.01.
60. Id. § 2711.03.
61. Id. § 2711.09.
62. Id. § 2711.10. These provisions are substantially similar to those of the federal legislation.
See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
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an award on narrow grounds,' and the court must enter judgment in conformity

with an award once an order confirming, modifying, or correcting the award has
Thus, under the Ohio
been made. 6" This judgment is then appealable.'
and
final
awards reversible, only
statute, arbitration agreements are enforceable,
reasons.
in specific instances and for limited
Recently it has become commonplace for insurance companies to issue
policies or to amend existing policies to include terms that arbitration will be
binding only when the award amount is less than a proscribed limit (in many cases

this limit coincides with the minimum amount of accident insurance required to
be carried by the state's financial responsibility statute).' Either party may
appeal to a court for a trial de novo of an arbitration award greater than that
proscribed amount.67 Such clauses have naturally caused dispute and have been
the subject of litigation within Ohio.'

Interestingly, the various Ohio courts that

have heard these cases have developed differing approaches and results.
It is universally accepted that Ohio policy favors arbitration as an expedient
and inexpensive alternative to civil litigation.' In Motorists Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Said,7 the Eighth District Court of Appeals held that a clause similar to

that in dispute in Schaefer was not void and was therefore enforceable7' even

though arbitratiofi normally contemplates a final, binding decision.' The court
stated that the express agreement of the parties controlled, whatever the result. 3
Moreover, the court held that the clause was not unconscionable because either
party - including a dissatisfied but victorious insured party - could avoid the

award, so that it was not unduly one-sided.74

63. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.11. The grounds listed here for modifying an award are:
1. there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake
in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award;
2. the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it is a matter
not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matters submitted;
3. the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy.
Id.
64. Id. § 2711.12.
65. Id. § 2711.15.
66. See, e.g., Roe v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 533 So. 2d 279, 280 (Fla. 1988).
67. Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1248.
68. Id.
69. Lighming Rod Mut. Ins. Co. v. Saffle, No. 15134, 1991 WL 231359, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App.
Nov. 6, 1991) (unpublished decision) (citing Menardi v. Petrigalta, 462 N.E.2d 1246, 1248-49 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1983)).
70. No. 084-119, 1987 WL 16532 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept.- 3, 1987) (unpublished decision),
overruled by Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Apisdorf, No. CP-185814, 1992 WL 333131, at *4 (Ohio Ct.
App. Nov. 12 1992) (unpublished decision).
71. Said, 1987 WI. 16532, at *3.
72. Id. at *2.
73. Id.
74. Id. at *3.
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In 1989, the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Eleventh District followed Said
in Roen v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. 5 The Roen court held that a
decision to arbitrate should not be less valid because it was conditional and that
the clause was not against public policy according to Said.76 Finally, in
Lightning Rod Mutual Insurance Co. v. Saffle," the Ninth District Court of
Appeals held that a substantially similar clause was not unconscionable because,
at the time of entering into the contract, it was not one-sided and applied equally
to both parties; hence, it was not "facially unequal."78 Further, the Saffle court
held that not allowing such limited agreements might actually violate the state's
interest in arbitration by dissuading persons from voluntarily engaging in
arbitration if they could not do it on their own terms.'
The Ohio Second District Court of Appeals decided differently in Trupp v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. I In this case, the clause involved
allowed for appeal de novo by either party."' The court held that the clause was
both unconscionable and unenforceable, stating that "[t]here is something terribly
unfair about the proposition: 'Heads, I win. Tails, we go two out of three.'"'
The Trupp court agreed with Justice Sweeney's concurring opinion in Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Marsh,' which stated that the clause was unfair
because an insured party was unlikely to avoid a high award and be faced with
litigation expenses.'M Justice Sweeny also stated that such a provision was
directly contrary to Ohio's strong public policy in favor of final and binding
arbitration by allowing the insurer to "have its cake and eat it too."' The Trupp
court considered four options in response to this type of clause' and settled on
refusing to recognize the limiting provision.' This decision made all arbitration

75. No. 87CV1844, 1989 WL 11266, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 10, 1989) (unpublished
decison).
76. Id. at *3.
77. No. 15134, 1991 WL 231359.
78. Id. at *4.
79. Id. at *6.
80. 575 N.E.2d 847 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
81. Id. at 848.
82. Id. at 850.
83. 472 N.E.2d 1061, 1063-64 (Ohio 1984) (Sweeney, J., concurring).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1064.
86. The options considered by the Trupp court were:
(1) refusing to recognize the arbitration agreement at all so that neither party could have
a claim submitted to arbitration;
(2) refusing to recognize the limiting clause, so that all awards would be appealable de
novo;
(3) refusing to recognize the limiting provision so that all awards were binding; and
(4) permitting an insured to appeal an award less than the financial responsibility act, but
not permitting the insurer to do likewise.
Trupp, 575 N.E.2d at 852.
87. Id. at 852-53.
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awards in Ohio binding in an attempt to support the court's - and the state's goal of encouraging arbitration.u
Finally, in Ellison v. General Accident Insurance Co. of America," the
Ohio Court of Appeals for the Sixth District found a substantially similar
arbitration agreement to be unconscionable and against public policy." The
court held that, in accord with public policy, all awards by arbitration regardless
of amount should be binding.9 This result conflicted with the Tenth District
Court of Appeals in Schaefer.' Although both courts held these similar clauses
invalid, the Schaefer court held all arbitration awards could be heard de novo,
while the Ellison court held that all arbitration awards were binding.' Noting
the disparity in results, the Ellison court moved to certify the issue to the Ohio
Supreme Court."
Upon this tangled morass the Ohio Supreme Court was called to impose
order and to decide, finally, which path should be followed.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
A.

The Plurality

Justice Douglas, writing for the Schaefer plurality, recognized that the
The court
inconsistencies in the Ohio courts of appeals had to be rectified.'
began its opinion by defining the root of the problem as the imprecise use of the
word "arbitration" and by noting that "binding arbitration" is redundant and that
"non-binding arbitration" is a contradiction in terms.' The court stated that
Next, the court
Ohio had a strong public policy in favor of arbitration.'
examined several definitions of the term "arbitration," including those from case
law," Black's Law Dictionary,m various treatises,'' and the Ohio statute

88. Id.

89. No. 87CV1822, 1991 WL 254232 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 15, 1991) (unpublished decision).
90. Id. at *2.
91. Id.
92. Id. at *4.

93. Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1249.
94. Ellison, 1991 WL 254232, at *4.
95. Id.

96. Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1244-45.
97. Id. at 1245.
98. Id. "A number of our cases decided over the course of many years reflect this court's
dedication to the strong public policy favoring arbitration." Id. (citing Findlay City Sch. Dist. Bd.
of Educ. v. Findlay Educ. Ass'n, 551 N.E.2d 186 (Ohio 1990)).
99. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court had previously defined "arbitration" as "a proceeding for the
hearing and determining of a dispute between parties in controversy by a person or persons chosen
by the parties instead of by a judicial tribunal." Id. (citing Ohio Council 8, AFSCME v. Ohio Dept.
of Mental Health, 459 N.E.2d 220, 222 (Ohio 1984)).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1993/iss1/9

10

Leppard: Leppard: Arbitration - Sure, but Only on Our Terms:
INSURANCE POLICY ARBITRATION

1993]

controlling arbitration.,1 2 All of these sources defined arbitration as absolute,
binding, and final. " As such, the court reasoned that the dispute resolution

for in the insurance policy was something besides
mechanism provided
°
"arbitration," '

which required that the result be binding "regardless of the

l

outcome. "(5
In analyzing the facts, the Schaefer court found that Allstate clearly
attempted to bypass the provisions of Ohio Revised Code Section 2711, which
required that arbitration awards be binding, by setting up an "escape hatch." "
Further, the court held that the insurance clause frustrated every public policy
favoring arbitration." 7 Allowing this type of provision, the court continued,
would subject parties to multiple proceedings, would consume unnecessary time,
and would not serve to clear crowded dockets;"t a as such, a provision providing

for anything but true arbitration would be held to be unenforceable."

9

The court next determined that prior cases which have interpreted Ohio
Council 8, AFSCME v. Ohio Department of Mental Health"" to mean that
parties are completely free to contract to non-binding arbitration are in error."
The Schaefer court held that parties should not be allowed to avoid an arbitrator's

award by writing a contract around it."'
After deciding that the Allstate insurance clause violated public policy, the
Schaefer plurality next held that in order to treat all parties equally, the subject
clause must simply be treated as unenforceable.1 3 The result is that either

100. Id. Black's Law Dictionary defines "arbitration" as "[a]n arrangement for taking and
abiding by the judgment of selected persons in some disputed matter, instead of carrying it to
established tribunals of justice, and is intended to avoid the formalities, the delay, the expense and
vexation of ordinary litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 105 (6th ed. 1990); see Schaefer, 590
N.E.2d at 1245.
101. Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1246. "'The purpose of arbitration is, therefore, to determine a
difference or dispute amicably, privately and finally and, in so doing, to exclude a court of law from
such determination." Id. (quoting FRANCES A. KELLOR, ARBITRATION IN ACTION 3-4 (1941))
(emphasis added by court).
102. Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2711.10, .11, .13).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.at 1247.
106. Id.at 1248; see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.01(A).
107. Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1248.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 459 N.E.2d 220.
111. Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1248. Ohio Council 8 involved a dispute between a union of state
employees and a state agency, where the Ohio Supreme Court decided that mediation and arbitration
are not functionally equivalent. Ohio Council 8. 459 N.E.2d at 223. The Ohio Supreme Court also
held that if parties agreed only to mediation, and not arbitration, the results could not be enforced and
could be rejected by either side. Id.
112. Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1248.
113. Id.at 1249.
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party to such an arbitration agreement can decide to litigate the issue in the proper
court for any reason.
B. The Concurrence
Four justices joined in the concurring opinion, which made the point that the
court should not issue a blanket prohibition against the use of agreements for nonbinding arbitration." 4 The concurrence stated that "non-binding" arbitration is
not an oxymoron" 5 and that such a narrow construction was not only against
Section 2711.21 of the Ohio Revised Code," 6 but that it also detracted from a
widely accepted construction of the term." 7 The concurring justices stated that
it was not the magic of the word "arbitration" but rather the underlying intent of
the parties which should determine the degree to which an award should bind the
parties."
They also stated that there may be provisions of contract law that
would control the finality of an award in the event the parties had agreed to "nonbinding" arbitration." 9
The concurring justices also argued that the state should support non-binding
arrangements because, they noted, having parties attempt to resolve their disputes
outside of the judiciary, regardless of the form the resolution takes, supports
public policy. "20 Furthermore, the concurring justices believed that the positive
effects of these non-binding procedures outweighed any negative effects.''
Having stated this, the concurring justices stated that they joined the plurality
because (1) the bargaining power of the parties was unfair and (2) the results of
this agreement would bind the insured in more frequent and less equitable
situations than the insurer.'2 The concurring justices also believed that the
court was overstepping its bounds and passing on an issue that was not squarely
in front of the court upon certification from the court of appeals. 23

114. Id. at 1250-51 (Wright, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 1250.
116. See id. Section 2711.21 provides for the parties to agree to non-binding arbitration in
medical, dental, optometric, and chiropratic claims cases and also allows parties to agree to be bound
by the arbitration decision. See Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.21(C).
117. Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1250.
118. Id. at 1251.
119. Id.
120. Id.

121. Id.
122. Id. at 1251-52.
123. Id. at 1252-53.
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It is clear that the Ohio Supreme Court, in deciding Schaefer, intended to
encourage disputing parties to engage in arbitration.'U The court realized that
Ohio was dedicated to a strong public policy favoring arbitration" 5 and also
recognized the many ill effects of enforcing escape clauses. 2 6 The precedent
established by the court, in effect, overruled both Said and Trupp and also
overruled the interpretation some courts gave Ohio Council 8 as to the parties'
freedom to contract."2 The Ohio Supreme Court had to decide between letting
the insurance clause stand, making all arbitration awards binding, or simply
making the whole clause unenforceable. The court made a major policy decision
and broke new2 ground in holding that the arbitration clause was simply
unenforceable.
If the court's goal was to support public policy by encouraging arbitration,
then it is difficult to see how the court has met this objective. By declaring the
arbitration clause unenforceable, the court opened the door allowing either party
to appeal the result immediately. This works directly against the rationale of
alleviating crowded court dockets. If anything, the holding serves to add cases
to court dockets since dissatisfied parties will most likely appeal. Perhaps the
best solution is to follow the court of appeals in Trupp, making the escape clause
unenforceable but also making any award final and binding.'29 Both Ohio
public policy and Ohio statutes support this view in that they encourage arbitration
and provide for a result that is reviewable only through certain prescribed
channels. 3"
The Schaefer decision does send a message to insurance companies that such
one-sided approaches to arbitration will not be tolerated, and, in this respect, it
supports public policy and consumer protection. But it is difficult to see how the
opinion will support public policy by encouraging the overall use of arbitration.
The Schaefer decision may encourage the use of binding arbitration agreements.
But it is equally possible that, when insurance companies draft policies, they will
simply eliminate the arbitration clause if it only means that they will ultimately
be forced to litigate.
Further, as noted by the concurrence, it is unclear how the opinion serves
to encourage the use of arbitration by prohibiting the parties from agreeing to
non-binding arbitration.'' Justice Wright argues correctly that any step toward

124. See id. at 1245.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 1248; see also supra note 108 and accompanying text.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See Ohio Council 8, 459 N.E.2d at 223; see also supra note 111 and accompanying text.
See Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1249.
Trupp, 575 N.E.2d at 852; see also supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1251 (Wright, I., concurring).
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dispute resolution that avoids actual litigation is a step in the right direction. 32
As long as the agreement is freely bargained for, the parties should be allowed
to contract for non-binding arbitration. Justice Wright states that agreements to
However,
non-binding arbitration are not inherently unconscionable.' 33
contracts of adhesion, similar to the Schaefer contract, do present problems when
an insured party is subject to unequal bargaining power. In this regard, the
decision is overbroad and actually discourages what it seeks to promote.
The U.S. Supreme Court will probably never examine the role escape
clauses play in insurance arbitration agreements. The McCarran-Ferguson
Act"M specifically delegates the authority to regulate matters of insurance to the
states; 135 as a result, federal courts seldom decide cases such as this. The
matter has, however, been litigated in many other state forums.
Of the states which have considered this issue, two have held the escape
clauses enforceable and in accord with public policy. The Supreme Court of
Florida decided in Roe v. American Mutual Insurance Co.'3 that no public
policy was adversely affected and that the parties were statutorily entitled to agree
to non-binding arbitration. 137 In Cohen v. Allstate Insurance Co., 3 a New
Jersey court held that an escape clause was not unconscionable, was not against
public policy, and would not necessarily tilt in favor of the insurance
company. 139 New Jersey, like Florida, has statutes which specifically allow
such agreements. "4
Apart from these two exceptions, both based on statutes that allow
agreements to non-binding arbitration, the great majority of states hold escape
clauses unenforceable and against public policy. Of this majority, few concur
with the Ohio Supreme Court in Schaefer. ' Holding such escape clauses
unenforceable while affirming the arbitrators' award, however, does enjoy wide
support.' 42 The common rationale is that simply to allow the parties to go to

132. See id. at 1251-53.
133. Id. at 1252.
134. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988). This Act provides for the preference for state law over
federal law in regulating the insurance industry. See Lamson, supra note 2, at 245.
135. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a).
136. 533 So. 2d 279. This case overrules Berger v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 515 So. 2d
997 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), which held an analogous provision unenforceable.
137. Roe, 533 So. 2d at 281 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.02 (West 1987)).
138. 555 A.2d 21 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
139. Id. at 23-24.
140. See id. at 22-23 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24-8, 17:28-1 (West 1991)).
141. The Supreme Court of Minnesota held in Schmidt v. Midwest Family Mutual Insurance Co.,
426 N.W.2d 870 (Minn. 1988), that an escape clause was unenforceable but made no clear indication
as to whether the award reached was binding or whether the parties were free to take the issue to trial.
See id. at 874-75.
142. See, e.g., Field v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 769 F. Supp. 1135, 1141 (D. Haw. 1991)
(holding that Hawaii law and public policy mandated that the award of the arbitrators be binding; the
award was reviewable only to the extent allowed by statute); United Servs. Auto, Ass'n v. Superior
Court, 270 Cal, Rptr. 376, 378 (Ct. App. 1990) (in a case brought by insurer to have an escape clause
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trial violates not only their intent to arbitrate but also the state's interest in
encouraging arbitration, a sensible and practical rationale.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the Ohio Supreme Court makes a clear attempt to encourage
arbitration among parties, the court should have more narrowly tailored its
decision to fit the needs of both public policy and individuals by allowing any
arbitration award to be binding regardless of the existence of an escape clause.
In so doing, the court would align itself with the majority of forums that have
considered the issue. The court would also facilitate the timely, efficient, and
final resolution of many types of claims - a policy with which few courts could
disagree.
STEVEN R. LEPPARD

voided, the court held the clause unenforceable and against public policy, and confirmed the award
of the arbitrators); Mendes v. Automobile Ins. Co., 563 A.2d 695, 699 (Conn. 1989) (holding the
escape clause to be against public policy and unenforceable, and affirming plaintiff's application to
confirm the award of the arbitrator); Worldwide Ins. Group v. Klopp, 603 A.2d 788, 791-92 (Del.
1992) (holding the escape clause against public policy of state and affirming the lower court's
judgment based on arbitrator's award); Pepin v. American Universal Ins. Co., 540 A.2d 21, 22-23
(R.I. 1988) (holding escape clause void as against public policy and sustaining plaintiffs' motions to
confirm arbitrators' awards); see also Goulart v. Crum & Forster Personal Ins. Co., 271 Cal. Rptr.
627, 628 (Ct. App. 1990).
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